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1 Introduction
Identifying the poorest for selection into social
transfer programmes is a perennial challenge facing
programme implementers, and a major point of
debate in the social protection literature. Targeting
describes a process for identifying households or
individuals who are defined as eligible for resource
transfers, thereby screening out those who are
defined as ineligible. Achieving this simple
objective is one of the most challenging aspects
of implementing social transfer programmes,
and typically requires trade-offs to be made
between targeting accuracy and targeting costs
(Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott 2004). Accurate
targeting is expensive and time-consuming, yet if
targeting is not done well or coverage is too
broad it can be extremely wasteful of scarce
resources and may undermine programme
effectiveness (Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa 2011).
With limited public resources (as is the case in
Rwanda), targeting of social benefits (as opposed
to universal coverage) is a necessity. In Rwanda
poverty is ‘objectively’ measured through a living
standards measurement survey (Enquete
Integrale des Conditions de Vie des Menages, or
EICV), which measures household consumption,
and the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS),
which measures asset poverty. Rwanda also
captures ‘social’ poverty through a social
categorisation process, Ubudehe, which has
much in common with participatory poverty
assessment approaches. This social categorisation
performed within the community has become the
basis for determining household eligibility for a
whole range of social benefits.
In this article we reflect on: (1) Rwanda’s history
of using community-based social-economic
mapping as the basis for targeting access to
social benefits and services; (2) the current
process of reviewing this approach; and
(3) whether a new approach will improve
measurement and monitoring of graduation
from poverty. We do this to draw lessons on the
effectiveness of different poverty identification
methods and to inform the design of targeting
and the measurement of graduation in future
social protection programming. We show that in
the Rwandan case, while empirically a ‘balanced
scorecard’ approach to identifying the poor(est)
clearly improves targeting efficiency, in practice
this must be combined with some community
involvement, building on the Ubudehe tradition.
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Identifying the poor/non-poor, and amongst them
the poorest, and thus determining eligibility for
social benefits for members of the population is
critical to supporting the Government of Rwanda’s
graduation vision; because identification enables
more accurate monitoring of changes in welfare,
and thus graduation trajectories. This article
draws on recent and ongoing empirical analysis
and vibrant discussions within the social protection
sector in Rwanda.
2 The Ubudehe system and its evolution into a
targeting mechanism1
Shah (2011) provides a detailed description of the
history and role of Ubudehe in his doctoral work
on the subject. He reviews the role and potential
of social mapping and participatory statistics in
Ubudehe, a Government of Rwanda-led policy
and approach initiated in 2001 ‘designed to
increase the level of institutional problem solving
capacity at the local level by citizens and local
government by putting into operation the
principles of citizen participation through
collective action’ (MINECOFIN 2003: 4).
The majority of literature and journalistic pieces
refer to Ubudehe as a ‘revived traditional practice’
(Ensign and Bertrand 2010). Indeed the literal
origins of the word refer to it being a Rwandan
practice and cultural value of working together to
solve problems, traditionally digging fields
collectively before the rains came and the planting
season began. It is considered a ‘home-grown
initiative’, aiming to nurture citizen participation
in development through collective action, with
roots in the Rwandan tradition where people used
to sit together to analyse their problems and help
each other in problem-solving at a local level.
‘However, the Ubudehe of post-genocide Rwanda
is more sophisticated and complex than most
analysts seem to suggest, drawing from a
combination of theories and a pragmatic political
context’ (Shah 2011: 1). Pragmatically, it was
conceived by ‘reformists’ within the Rwandan
government and their development partners,
emerging in its contemporary form in 2001, amidst
several opportune conditions and collaborations.
The reformists argued a case for participatory
democracy and achieved a consensus where the
aim was to:
give the floor and freedom to the people so
that they can talk about their problems and
how they can be solved. A Rwandan citizen
has never been given the floor, he has always
been waiting for instructions from his
superiors and he has always been guided by
them. It is necessary, therefore, to look for
‘mechanisms’ of giving the floor to people
(cited in Shah 2011: 57).
It was within this context of consensus around
looking for mechanisms of giving ‘floor’ to the
people that Ubudehe emerged.
At the same time as space opened up for
developing mechanisms to enable increased
participation at the local level in Rwanda,
international development institutions were
promoting accountability to the poor through
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and
decentralisation as a ‘good governance’ strategy.
Shah argues that:
the rhetoric behind donor discourses of PRSPs
as a mechanism to afford citizens the
opportunity to participate in articulating their
needs and preferences dovetailed neatly into
the vision of participatory democracy
envisaged. What the development trend of
PRSPs did was to coincidentally bring
together a group of actors from within
government, donor and civil society, who
would become the core protagonists in
conceiving, designing and driving Ubudehe
(Shah 2011: 58–9).
Indeed, within Rwanda’s first PRSP, Ubudehe is
seen as modernising a traditional concept,
adapted to ‘build on the positive aspects of this
history and complement it with modern
participatory techniques, which have proven
their worth in community development… It sets
out to strengthen democratic processes and
governance starting from people’s aspirations,
ability and traditions’ (VUP 2011: 13).
Ubudehe as an approach to poverty reduction
started as a pilot project in Butare, southern
Rwanda, as part of the Participatory Poverty
Assessment to provide background data for the
PRSP. Once the PRSP was adopted, Ubudehe was
rolled out nationwide (as a means of
categorisation and as a programme of community
development). Since 2001, through Participatory
Poverty Assessment methodology at village level,
the programme has been collecting information
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on the social and economic status of the
population (national categorisation has taken
place in 2001, 2005–6, 2007–8 and 2012). In the
initial mapping through this Ubudehe process,
facilitators (local and international) determined
that, from all the local understandings of poverty
and wealth and status, six categories could be
used to stratify the entire population in relation
to its living conditions. These categories are
known as ‘Ubudehe categories’ and are named in
Kinyarwanda as: Umutindi Nyakujya, Umutindi,
Umukene, Umukene Wifashije, Umukungu and
Umukire. Table 1 sets out these categories and
their characteristics.
The English translation does not do justice to the
metaphorical nature of some of the characteristics.
For example, for households in category 1, umutindi
nyakujya, the literal translation of the
characteristics captures the misery of extreme
poverty; for instance, ‘doesn’t even have nails to
scratch himself with’ and ‘death would be a relief ’.
Whether the category characteristics are still
meaningful, given Rwanda’s strong progress on
poverty reduction and the shifts in the profile of
poverty, is a pertinent question, and one we
address here. Since the first Ubudehe exercise
the proportion of the population living in
‘objective’ consumption poverty has reduced
from 59 per cent to 45 per cent, the proportion
living in extreme poverty has reduced from
40 per cent to 24 per cent, and the depth of
poverty has reduced (the poverty gap was 41 per
cent in 2000/1 and 33 per cent in 2010/11; the
extreme poverty gap was 34 per cent and 26 per
cent respectively).2
The extent to which these Ubudehe
characteristics are helpful in distinguishing
between the poor and non-poor is also a pertinent
question. Since the first Ubudehe exercise access
to basic education has improved, with school
enrolment now reaching 96.5 per cent.3 Access to
health care has also improved (reflected in
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Table 1 Ubudehe categories
Category name and number Characteristics
1 Umutindi Nyakujya Destitute. Need to beg to survive. Have no land or livestock. Lack adequate 
(Those in Abject Poverty) shelter, clothing and food. Fall sick often and have no access to medical 
care. Children are malnourished and they cannot afford to send them to 
school. Not respected. Discriminated against.
2 Umutindi The main difference between the Umutindi and the Umutindi Nyakujya is that 
(The Very Poor) people in this group are physically capable of working on land owned by others, 
although they themselves have either no land, or very small landholdings, 
and no livestock. They suffer from low harvests and also have no access to 
health care or schooling
3 Umukene These households have some land and housing. They live on their own 
(The Poor) labour and produce, though they have no savings; they can eat, even if the 
food is not very nutritious. However, they do not have a surplus to sell in 
the market, their children do not always go to school and they often have 
no access to health care.
4 Umukene Wifashije Households in this group share many of the characteristics of the Umukene but 
(The Resourceful Poor) in addition they have small ruminants and their children go to primary school. 
They have a few animals and petty income to satisfy a few other needs. 
5 Umukungu People in this group have larger landholdings with fertile soil and enough to  
(The Food Rich) eat. They have livestock, often have paid jobs and can access health care. They 
employ others on their own farms and at times have access to paid  
employment. They have some savings.
6 Umukire People in this group have land and livestock and often have salaried jobs. They 
(The Money Rich) have good housing, often own a vehicle, and have enough money to lend and 
to get credit from the bank. Many migrate to urban centres.
Source Shah (2013: 54); MINECOFIN (2003) and Joseph (2006).
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improvements in the under-five mortality rate
which has reduced by two-thirds between 2000
and 20104 and improvements in life expectancy
from 51 to 64 years over the same period)5 as a
result of a series of health reforms including the
roll-out of community health centres,
underpinned by a cadre of community health
workers and a programme of community health
insurance. Furthermore, housing policies passed
and implemented in the last ten years means that
‘lack of shelter’ is not necessarily an appropriate
and widespread indicator of poverty any more.
As the nature of poverty has shifted in Rwanda since
2001, so too has the process of Ubudehe
categorisation. While the main advantage of
community-based targeting is that local residents
have personal knowledge of their neighbours,
which outsiders do not, the main risk is that the
process may be dominated by local elites who
capture the benefits and exclude socially
marginalised groups (see Sabates-Wheeler, Lind
and Hoddinott 2013, for evidence on local
capture). On the other hand, problems may
emerge because Ubudehe criteria are not specific
or ‘objective’/easily measurable. This means that
there may be a subjective, ‘loose’ or locally
adapted interpretation of the criteria making
them difficult to apply consistently across
different localities and regions or over time.
Given that the national Ubudehe system provides
the foundation for determining eligibility for a
whole slew of social benefits (including the Vision
2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) (social
protection), health insurance, tertiary
scholarships, waiving of land registration fees),
the quality and consistency of this categorisation
process is a key determinant of the effectiveness
and efficiency of targeting and of programme
outcomes – graduation being a pertinent one.
Community-based social mapping (which the
Ubudehe system uses) becomes community-based
targeting used for allocating resources. This form
of targeting delegates or devolves beneficiary
selection to community members.
While in theory the socioeconomic mapping
happens in a highly participatory and democratic
way, over time the process has become
increasingly administrative. Villages no longer
produce social maps, rather data collected by the
Ubudehe committee are entered manually into a
table and processed by computer. Recent
research (Berglund 2013) suggests that the
process has become top-down and technocratic.
As a result, people are not always aware as to
why they are in a specific category or what
defines that category.
A recent study supported by the Rwandan Civil
Society Platform (Sentama 2014) highlights a
number of shortcomings in the way that the
Ubudehe process is now being carried out. Of the
perceived process of Ubudehe categorisation,
68.8 per cent of respondents from a sample of
VUP beneficiary and non-beneficiary households
said that they thought it was ‘not well done’ or
‘done badly’. From these, many said that they did
not fully take part in the categorisation process,
and some accuse the local authorities of deciding
unilaterally about whom to place in one category
or another (op. cit.: 23). Respondents also
expressed concern about indicators:
The indicators followed to categorise people in
Ubudehe program were not clear. The [officials in
charge of Ubudehe] could find that you have a house
and then classify you in the category they want
without asking you whether the house is yours or
what: not everyone was consulted (a citizen of
Rwezamenyo sector – Sentama 2014: 24).
When asked how the current Ubudehe
categorisation relates to the traditional practice
of Ubudehe, the findings were startling. The
majority of respondents (63.6 per cent) said that
there is no linkage between the two and 32.8 per
cent saw some connection despite shortcomings.
Before [in traditional Ubudehe] people used to support
mutually in solidarity; it was solidarity in farming or
building households; now categories under Ubudehe
program do not at all refer to this solidarity; it is
individual work in loneliness (a citizen of
Rwezamenyo sector – Sentama 2014: 26).
Finally, from 250 households interviewed,
83.6 per cent stated that they were very
dissatisfied with the category in which they had
been placed. Only 6 per cent indicated that they
were satisfied or very satisfied with their
categorisation. An obvious reason for the high
levels of dissatisfaction was related to the very
low levels of farmland, shelter and livestock
owned by many of the households. Many
category 3 households (62 per cent were in
category 3) stated that their low asset levels
qualify them for category 2 (23 per cent of the
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sample), yet they ‘have been put’ unfairly in
category 3. This finding, together with
qualitative work, questions the participatory and
collective action ethos of the Ubudehe process.
Over time, as noted above by recent research,
the Ubudehe categorisation process has become
increasingly ad hoc and less transparent. The
nature and profile of poverty have clearly
changed since Ubudehe categorisation first took
place. In the next section we draw on new
analysis to consider how well Ubudehe identifies
the poor and amongst them the poorest.
3 The problem: how well does the Ubudehe
system identify the poor?
Each February the president of Rwanda leads an
annual leadership retreat to take stock of
progress and challenges and set priorities for the
coming year. The 2014 leadership retreat
commitments include a commitment to
‘expedite revisions to Ubudehe’, given the
increasing evidence that the Ubudehe
categorisation process is under strain.
Government of Rwanda policy papers have
captured evidence of interest groups mobilising
locally for re-categorisation of their client group
into categories 1 and 2 to ensure access to social
protection benefits (MINALOC 2012) – a
variation of ‘elite capture’ discussed above;
citizen complaints about targeting decisions
based on Ubudehe status for education bursaries
led to the convening of a dedicated Ministerial
Commission to resolve complaints in 2013; and
several technical reports testify to challenges
with using Ubudehe to target benefits (VUP
2011). New evidence, which we present below,
highlights that Ubudehe is not effectively
categorising the poor.
In order to objectively assess the extent to which
Ubudehe status correlates with consumption
poverty measures, we were able to match
households in the EICV3 national household
survey with their Ubudehe status contained in
the Ubudehe database.6 This matching allowed
us to look at the distribution of Ubudehe status
across consumption quintiles. In theory, there
should be a strong correlation between
consumption poverty and Ubudehe status, with
those in the poorest quintile in particular
(roughly corresponding to the extreme poor)
making up the majority of Ubudehe categories
1 and 2. Instead, as Figure 1 shows, very few of
the poorest households (2 per cent) were
identified as Ubudehe category 1, and the richest
quintile households were equally likely to be
allocated that status as the poorest (indeed, it
was fairly consistent across all consumption
quintiles). Ubudehe category 2 does decrease
with consumption quintile, but many of the
richest are nevertheless included. The most
frequent Ubudehe category is 3, with 61 per cent
of the population allocated to it.7
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Figure 1 Distribution of Ubudehe status within consumption quintiles (matching) 
Source Authors’ own.
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This analysis suggests that 62 per cent of the
extreme poor would be excluded from VUP since
they are not in Ubudehe categories 1 or 2. At the
same time, 2 per cent of the richest quintile are
classified as Ubudehe category 1 and 14 per cent
as Ubudehe category 2, meaning that 16 per cent
of them would be eligible for VUP.
4 How to identify the poor and the poorest
Recognising the difficulties of the current
Ubudehe approach in correctly identifying the
poor, the Government of Rwanda moved quickly
to think about a new classification system which
will use both community processes of poverty
identification and some objective indicators for
identification as well as monitoring. Initial
discussions have focused on a four-category
system with a limited number of indicators per
category. The indicators initially proposed
included home ownership, for instance, where it
was suggested that absence of home ownership or
ability to rent would be a good identifier of the
most poor. Other proposed indicators included
livestock ownership, lighting source in the home
and a simple asset index. In order to test whether
these simple asset variables are indeed adequate
for identifying the poor we take EICV3 data and
look at the correlation between different assets
with consumption poverty quintiles. Specifically,
we look at the following variables: highest level of
education in the household; type of lighting
source; type of cooking fuel; type of toilet; type of
wall; roof type; household durable assets;
livestock ownership.
Table 2 presents a sample of this analysis showing
the distribution of household construction and
durables by quintile in rural areas (since poverty
is largely rural).8 We can see that the variables
are not strong predictors of poverty and therefore
not appropriate for targeting or use as graduation
indicators. For instance, while electricity use for
lighting or flush toilet ownership is helpful for
identifying the richest, most other variables do
not provide sufficient variation across quintiles to
be useful. The use of oil lamps or firewood for
lighting do show reasonable trends across
quintiles, but they are not sufficient for the
purposes of identification. While not reported
here, the same pattern exists for livestock
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Table 2 Lighting source and toilet type, by consumption quintile, rural
Lighting source
Quintile Electricity Oil lamp Firewood Lantern Battery Other Total
Lowest 2 10 41 15 21 17 19
Second 1 13 20 22 23 15 20
Third 6 18 18 25 22 16 21
Fourth 15 27 14 25 22 27 23
Highest 76 32 7 13 12 25 18
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Toilet type
Quintile Flush toilet Pit latrine Pit latrine Other No toilet Total
unimproved improved
Lowest 1 17 23 - 29 19
Second 6 20 20 23 19 20
Third 6 21 23 50 19 21
Fourth 10 23 23 28 18 23
Highest 77 19 11 - 15 18
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors’ own.
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ownership and other assets, such as beds, radios
and bicycles.
These findings show, unsurprisingly, that asset
approaches (of which this exercise is a type) are
extremely difficult to apply to rural areas.9 As we
found for Rwanda, variables either only separate
out the richest quintile from the rest, or they are
too evenly distributed across quintiles to be
relevant. Unfortunately, there are simply no
easily identifiable variables (or combination of
variables) that would be able to clearly and
accurately distinguish the poorest from those
who are better off.
A possible alternative would be to construct an
asset index that combines a few variables which
show reasonable correlation to poverty by using
factor analysis. However, from our analysis of
asset index scores, we found that about half the
population is allocated exactly the same score,
making it impossible to sort the population into
five equal quintile ‘bins’ against which we could
compare asset quintile with consumption
quintile.10
In fact, we found that 71 per cent of the poorest
consumption quintile (roughly the extreme poor)
are correctly allocated in the 47.5 per cent of
asset scores nationally, but so are 25 per cent of
the richest quintile and 40 per cent of the second
richest. Also, if we were to use the lowest asset
index group scores for targeting, only 27 per cent
of beneficiaries would be from the poorest
quintile and 24 per cent from the second poorest,
while roughly half (the remainder) would be
from those above the poverty line. This shows
that even if there were enough budget to cover
47.5 per cent of the population in the bottom
asset group, the index would not do a good job in
targeting/identifying the poor.
This raises an interesting dilemma: trying to aim
for simplicity (in the definition of variables and
in the number used in the index) is likely to lead
to large percentages of the population being
scored exactly the same. This is not surprising
given the large numbers of poor households in
Rwanda, yet in order to allocate scarce resources,
identify households for benefits and accurately
monitor graduation trajectories, we need to be
able to distinguish better between poor
households in terms of their need. How then can
we do this?
5 Developing a simple scorecard methodology
Given the obvious difficulties in using these basic
indicators as a way to categorise households, we
developed a simple scorecard methodology to
test whether we can improve targeting efficiency.
Proxy Means Tests (PMTs) are a scorecard-type
of targeting, where a limited number of variables
(ideally those that are easily recorded and
verified) are used to determine eligibility. The
steps in a PMT/scorecard are:
? A regression model of the correlates of
poverty is estimated. The PMT regression
then provides the PMT scoring system, with
the estimated coefficients serving as the
weights for the scoring.
? PMT scores are then calculated for each
household based on these weights. The PMT
scores are essentially predicted values of
consumption and provide a ranking of
households over a population.
? For targeting purposes, households can be
selected into a programme based on their
PMT score, once a cut-off value of the score is
determined.
Targeting efficiency, graduation trajectories and
poverty impact of the PMT scoring system can
then be evaluated, essentially by comparing how
well the predicted values in the PMT score
compare with actual consumption at different
programme coverage levels. So for example, with
a targeted coverage of 20 per cent, targeting
efficiency measures the extent to which the PMT
score accurately predicts whether a household’s
consumption is in the bottom two deciles.
5.1 Findings
5.1.1 Identifying variables associated with poverty
In order to decide which variables should be
included in the regression/scorecard, it is
important to understand which variables, together,
are most associated with poverty. Looking at the
distribution of different variables across
consumption quintiles helps to provide a good
picture of the characteristics of the poor versus
those who are better off.
The following were identified as some of the most
relevant variables: type of lighting source, type of
cooking fuel, type of toilet, type of wall, roof type,
household durable assets, and livestock. We also
found that education (as proxied by the highest
level of education in the household) was
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correlated strongly to consumption quintiles.
Those in the poorest quintile are far more likely
to have had only some primary education (56 per
cent compared to 23 per cent in the richest),
while those in the richest are three times more
likely to have had secondary education (11 per
cent of the poorest quintile have a member with
secondary education compared to 33 per cent of
the richest).
5.1.2 Regression results
Two scorecard options were considered. The first
includes more variables, while the second is a
shortened version (keeping those variables with
the more economically and statistically
significant coefficients). The regressions, which
use the log of per-adult equivalent consumption
as the dependent variable, were run for each
scorecard.11 The signs of the coefficients are as
expected: higher levels of education are
associated with higher consumption, while
household size and number of children are
associated with lower consumption. Households
using electricity for lighting are better off than
all other types of lighting, while those using
charcoal for cooking fuel are better off than
those using firewood.
Ownership of assets (livestock, radio, bed,
bicycle, fridge) are all associated with higher
consumption. Having a household member work
in agricultural wage work is associated with
lower consumption (as would be expected), while
wage work in the non-farm sector and
participation in some kind of household non-
farm enterprise (of any size, including micro-
enterprise) is associated with higher
consumption. The regressions both have a fairly
high predictive power.12
5.1.3 Errors of inclusion and exclusion
Figure 2 shows errors of inclusion/exclusion by
programme size and by the two scorecards. For a
programme covering 8 per cent of the population
(as expected based on the national scale-up of the
existing programme), errors would be 66 per cent
for PMT1, meaning 66 per cent of beneficiaries
would be above the 8th percentile in
consumption. A programme reaching 10 per cent
of the population would have errors of 59 per cent
for PMT1, while one reaching 30 per cent (which
would require substantially more financial
resources) would have errors of 40 per cent. This
pattern of decreasing errors by programme size is
typical of PMT/scorecard approaches; the wider
the net, the easier it is to make sure households
are captured more accurately.
Errors are slightly higher under the shorter
scorecard compared to the longer one, reflecting
the loss of predictive power as a result of the
removal of some variables. Nevertheless, the
results are fairly consistent, suggesting that a
shorter scorecard, which would be easier to
implement, might be preferable even if there is a
slight loss in terms of accuracy.
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Figure 2 Errors of inclusion/exclusion by programme size/cut-off
Source Authors’ own.
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Errors are not distributed evenly across the
population, however, but are instead concentrated
amongst the poor. We see from Figure 3 that
58 per cent of beneficiaries would be in the
poorest consumption quintile, 25 per cent in the
second, and 11 per cent in the third for PMT1.
PMT2 is quite similar, with just slightly less in
the first quintile and slightly more in the next
three quintiles. Less than 1 per cent would be
from the highest quintile in either option. This
would be a marked improvement over the results
found from current targeting (Figure 3, column 1),
where only 25 per cent were in the first quintile,
21 per cent were in the second and over 16 per
cent were in each of the three richest quintiles
(as estimated by those households participating
in VUP in the EICV3 sample).
The PMT/scorecard would be biased towards the
extreme poor and the poor, so at a programme
coverage of 10 per cent, 21 per cent of the poor
and 31 per cent of the extreme poor would be
covered. The overarching point here is that
identification of the poor/non-poor is highly
sensitive to the eligibility criteria and cut-offs
chosen. This means that graduation thresholds
and measurements of graduation pathways will
be equally sensitive to this.
5.1.4 Comparison with existing Ubudehe approach
Data on actual VUP participation in the
household survey (EICV3) exists, so we are able
to compare the consumption poverty of actual
VUP beneficiaries in EICV3 with potential
beneficiaries of the PMT options, as shown in
Figure 3. It is clear that the two PMT options
would draw the majority of beneficiaries from
the poorest consumption quintile, compared to
just 25 per cent of existing VUP beneficiaries.
PMT1 would draw 17 per cent of its beneficiaries
from the top three quintiles, compared to 54 per
cent of current VUP beneficiaries.
5.1.5 Errors of exclusion: important not to ignore
In terms of errors of inclusion, it is clear that
those who are included tend to be amongst the
poor, meaning the approach would increase the
targeting efficiency of VUP. However, it is also
important to be aware that it is ultimately a
rationing tool, and that the errors of exclusion
mean that households that are equally worthy (in
terms of their poverty levels) will be excluded
while their neighbours, who may be very similar,
are included.
This has led to PMTs often being viewed as
‘lotteries’ by households in areas where they are
used, as they find it impossible to understand why
some are included and some are excluded.13
Ultimately any targeting approach is a rationing
device, and PMTs may be a more quantitative way
to ration, but the quantitative nature does not
remove all arbitrariness from the process. For
example, different households will be incorrectly
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Figure 3 Distribution of beneficiaries by consumption quintile, Ubudehe versus PMT options
Source Authors’ own.
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included/excluded depending on the specific
variables included in the model. A technical
approach such as the PMT therefore does not
mean it is entirely ‘fair’, and it is always important
to ensure that the implications of this exclusion
error are well considered. Of course, a well-
functioning appeals and complaints procedure
would be the first port of call for households to
raise concerns associated with targeting fairness.
6 Implications for the community-based approach
of Ubudehe and implementation concerns
In addition to the potential gains in targeting
accuracy from applying a PMT/scorecard
approach, it is also important to consider how
changes would affect community participation in
the process and community ownership of and
buy-in to the results. In Rwanda, the community
involvement has always been a fundamental part
of the poverty identification process, and must
remain so. PMTs are generally thought of as
entirely technical exercises that would not
involve any community participation. In practice,
however, community participation could be
incorporated into a PMT scorecard approach in
the following ways:
1 Communities establish which households should be
included in the scorecard. 
This may limit the accuracy of a PMT since
legitimately poor households may be excluded
from the ‘eligible’ bottom two categories in
the first stage. It depends upon the quality of
participation. Similarly, non-eligible households
(those that are wealthy by consumption
standards) may be categorised in the lowest
two categories and be able to claim benefits.
2 Communities validate the ranking/beneficiaries after
the PMT has been undertaken.
This is the most common approach. Through
community validation, errors of exclusion could
be minimised and errors of inclusion corrected.
This would also support the application of
scheme-specific eligibility criteria (for example,
availability of household labour in VUP criteria).
3 The scorecard is administered to communities in
groups rather than at an individual household level.
This may provide some validation of responses
and maintains the community tradition of
Ubudehe. It is likely that only the short
version of the scorecard, without a household
roster, can be applied in this way.
Participation may simply improve the accuracy of
targeting, or it may also ensure greater ownership
and buy-in of the community to the results. In the
Rwandan context, both objectives are important:
improving targeting accuracy for more optimal
allocation of scarce resources and helping to
ensure greater ownership of the community,
where social cohesion concerns are uppermost.
Of course, the scorecard/PMT would not be
implemented in a vacuum: the Ubudehe
approach has already been operating and people
are familiar with it. The question is whether,
given the lack of ownership of current results by
community members, a more technical ‘black
box’ approach would be considered an
improvement, or whether poor households would
feel that the absence of a community poverty
ranking excluded them from the process. These
questions can only be answered by testing the
scorecard in practice.
7 Conclusions
In a context of high economic growth and a
vision for the future that holds high ambitions
for the reduction of poverty, Rwanda has an
opportunity to ensure that the benefits accruing
to the country are experienced by all members of
society. The proper identification of those in
need, with appropriate design in targeting of
social services and benefits will be key, both to
continuing to deliver sustainable graduation
from poverty and to ensuring that the poorest
are not left behind.
This article has illustrated just how difficult it is
to identify the poor/non-poor and how inclusion
of households into social programmes is
determined by what coverage thresholds are
identified – usually a political choice. Poverty
targeting and graduation are intimately related,
as criteria for one has obvious implications for
the other. Furthermore, monitoring poverty
identification criteria over time also enables
monitoring of graduation trajectories. In theory,
applying a simple poverty scorecard may help
ensure that more of the poor(est) are classified
as such, therefore strengthening Rwanda’s
Ubudehe approach. Through field testing the
scorecard approach we will be able to understand
whether the theoretical results presented in this
article apply in practice. Field testing will test
both how the scorecard could be applied in a
community setting and the results of the
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scorecard in practice. It will also seek to
understand communities’ perceptions of this
‘objective’ approach and how participation can
be incorporated. This hybrid approach promises
to provide new insights for the targeting
literature – on incorporating community
participation into a scorecard approach, or
incorporating a scorecard approach into a
community-based, (more or less) participatory
method of socioeconomic categorisation.
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Notes
1 The history of the genesis of the Ubudehe
system presented in this section draws
substantially on the doctoral work of Shah
(2011).
2 EICV 2000/01, 2005/06 and 2010/11 analysed
in NISR (2012) and World Bank (2013).
3 Net enrolment rate. 
4 INS (2006, 2011). Under-five mortality has
improved from 196 deaths per 1,000 live
births to 76 per 1,000 live births in 2010. 
5 NISR (2014). 
6 Thanks to the support of the National
Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR), we
were basically able to match the survey data
with the administrative data, since the
Ubudehe database includes most households
in the country. 
7 The graph does not display results for
Ubudehe categories 5 and 6 because they are
so infrequent, at less than 1 per cent of the
total. For this reason some columns sum to
slightly less than 100 per cent.
8 Similar results are available from the authors
for a range of other assets.
9 In a wide meta-analysis of the empirical
literature, Howe et al. (2008) and Howe et al.
(2009) found that asset indices are generally a
poor proxy for consumption expenditure. They
perform better in middle-income countries
compared to low-income countries, and are a
better proxy for consumption in urban rather
than rural areas. In the canonical paper on
asset measures of poverty, Filmer and
Pritchett (1998: 14) found ‘reasonably good’
coherence between asset quintiles and
consumption quintiles, but even here only two-
thirds of households in the bottom two
consumption quintiles were also identified as
being in the bottom two quintiles by assets.
Similarly, only 56 per cent of households in the
richest consumption quintile were also in the
top asset quintile, while 13 per cent were
identified in the bottom asset quintile. 
10 Using the variables lighting_oil,
lighting_firewood, lighting_electricity,
cooking_charcoal, wall_cement toilet_flush,
roof_thatch, and bike.
11 Detailed regression results are available from
the authors on request
12 An adjusted R-squared of .635 (meaning that
the variables in the regression account for
63.5 per cent of the variation in consumption
across households) for the more inclusive list
of variables and .603 for the shorter list.
13 See Kidd and Wylde (2011) for further
discussion.
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